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Abstract 
 
The post-Maastricht period is marked by an integration paradox. While the basic 
constitutional features of the European Union have remained stable, EU activity has 
expanded to an unprecedented degree. This form of integration without 
supranationalism is no exception or temporary deviation from traditional forms of 
European integration. Rather, it is a distinct phase of European integration, what is 
called ‘the new intergovernmentalism’ in this article. This approach to post-
Maastricht integration challenges theories that associate integration with transfers of 
competences from national capitals to supranational institutions and those that reduce 
integration to traditional socioeconomic or security-driven interests. This article 
explains the integration paradox in terms of transformations in Europe's political 
economy, changes in preference formation and the decline of the ‘permissive 
consensus’. It presents a set of six hypotheses that develop further the main claims of 
the new intergovernmentalism and that can be used as a basis for future research. 
 
Introduction 
 
The years since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 have been characterized 
by a seemingly unrelenting expansion in the scope of European Union activity. In this 
post-Maastricht period, the EU has not only completed the transition from single 
market to monetary union and expanded from 15 to 28 members, but it has also 
increased its involvement in socioeconomic governance and justice and home affairs. 
The EU now has a common foreign and security policy, its own foreign policy 
representative and a European diplomatic service. From social policy to the 
environment, virtually all aspects of government policy in Europe today are shaped by 
the EU in some way. 
And yet for all this integration, the basic constitutional features of the Union 
have remained remarkably stable. At Maastricht it was decided that major new areas 
of EU activity would be developed without conceding substantial powers to the 
European Commission or the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). Far from rejecting or 
revising this principle, the Treaties of Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon confirmed it. 
Though the area of justice and home affairs was ‘communitarized’, it still departs 
from the classic Community method in several key respects. In other new areas of EU 
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activity, such as the extension of employment and social policy co-ordination at 
Amsterdam and Nice, supranational decision-making was studiously avoided. 
Though it has gained much power in this period, the European Parliament has 
contributed to these developments. Concerned with expanding its own institutional 
reach, the EU legislature has shown a willingness to depart from the Community 
method providing it is involved to some degree in new areas of EU activity. Many 
had expected the global financial crisis to edge Europe towards further 
supranationalism, but this has not yet happened. The two key intergovernmental 
treaties following the crisis – the fiscal compact and the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) Treaty – empower the Commission to a limited degree in one case 
and not at all in the other. The same can be said of the EU's plans for banking union, 
which have seen Member States transfer new powers for financial supervision to the 
European Central Bank (ECB) while ensuring that the Commission's influence over 
banking resolution is constrained. 
With the constitutional framework unchanged, integration since Maastricht has 
been pursued via an intensification of policy co-ordination between Member States. 
This has occurred at all levels: from heads of state or government in the European 
Council down to national experts in comitology committees. This co-ordination varies 
in its range of formality and in its degree of institutionalization (compare the shadowy 
existence of the ‘Frankfurt Group’ with the routinized actions of the political and 
security committee), but it consistently avoids transferring more powers to traditional 
supranational bodies – notably the Commission and the Court. 
This degree of policy co-ordination has been possible because of the 
deliberative and consensual quality of EU decision-making. Deliberation and 
consensus-seeking have long been taken to be the behavioural hallmarks of 
supranationalism, but in the post-Maastricht period they have imposed themselves as 
dominant norms regulating the relations between national actors.
2
 We see this in the 
pre-eminence of the European Council – a deliberative and consensus-building body 
par excellence. It is confirmed in the problem-solving orientation of national experts – 
a phenomenon captured in the burgeoning work on epistemic communities and 
comitology (Brandsma, 2013, pp. 8–9). National parliamentarians now regularly 
deliberate with one another in three interparliamentary conferences: the Conference of 
Community and European Affairs Committees of Parliaments of the European Union 
(COSAC), the Interparliamentary Conference for the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), and the 
Interparliamentary Conference on Economic and Financial Governance. Even in areas 
as firmly tied to national sovereignty as security and defence policy, co-ordination is 
driven by the strength of a shared professional ethos among national officials (Davis 
Cross, 2011). Though conflict remains (for instance, in the falling out over Iraq or 
disagreements over financial support for Greece), participants seek solutions from 
within the process and less through vetoes or exits. Where individual Member States 
have negotiated opt-outs to specific aspects of EU activity (for example, the UK in 
justice and home affairs), the attachment to deliberation and consensus has prevented 
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their exclusion from negotiations in these areas (Adler Nissen, 2008; Holzinger and 
Schimmelfennig, 2012, p. 301). 
Delegation, where it has occurred in the post-Maastricht period, has been to de 
novo bodies rather than traditional supranational institutions.
3
 The category of de 
novo bodies is broad, but points to a key development since 1992. It refers to newly 
created institutions that often enjoy considerable autonomy by way of executive or 
legislative power and have a degree of control over their own resources. However, 
they fulfil functions that could have been delegated to the Commission and tend to 
contain mechanisms for Member State representation as a part of their governance 
structure. De novo bodies include the ECB, the European External Action Service 
(EEAS), the ESM, and numerous regulatory and executive agencies. 
This tendency towards deliberation and consensus-building, and the delegation 
to de novo bodies, represents an important integration paradox: Member States pursue 
more integration but stubbornly resist further supranationalism (Puetter, 2012, p. 
168). This constitutes a challenge to EU studies given that more integration has so 
often been taken to mean transfers of competences away from national capitals and 
towards supranational EU institutions. For theories reducing integration to a series of 
bargains between nation-states, the post-Maastricht period is equally paradoxical. 
While the constitutional framework has remained stable, the degree of integration has 
been extensive and unprecedented. National actors have consistently favoured 
deliberative and consensual behaviour over national vetoes and threats of exit, and 
their interactions have gone far beyond the narrow confines of intergovernmental 
conferences (IGCs). States remain central to the European integration story, but they 
are not the ‘obstinate’ nation-states of traditional intergovernmentalist theory 
(Hoffmann, 1995). 
Our starting point for this article is that this form of integration is not a 
temporary deviation from a more longstanding supranational trend. Rather, it is a new 
phase in European integration that has become entrenched and systematically 
reproduced in the two decades since Maastricht. While recognizing that periodization 
is difficult and that processes of sociopolitical change rarely respect the neat 
boundaries of legal texts and treaties, we take the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 as our 
starting point because it stands out as the moment where the acceleration in EU 
activity was formally cast on a basis other than the traditional Community method. In 
this article, we label this post-Maastricht phase in European integration ‘the new 
intergovernmentalism’. 
We are aware that the terms ‘intergovernmental’ and ‘supranational’ are often 
given different meanings in the scholarly literature. Following Haas (2004), in his 
discussion of the meaning of ‘supranationality’, we note that these terms refer both to 
separate decision-making logics (integration through formal acts versus voluntary 
policy co-ordination) and to certain behavioural norms that the ‘grand’ theories of EU 
integration have associated with one or another level of decision-making and political 
authority. In a purely institutional sense, the new intergovernmentalism points 
towards an absence of supranational decision-making as typically framed by the 
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Community method – that is, the transfer of lawmaking power to the European level, 
an expansion in the initiating powers of the Commission and the enforcement powers 
of the CJEU, and the resort to majority voting to pass legislation binding on Member 
States (Dehousse, 2011, p. 3). More broadly, the new intergovernmentalism also 
highlights the way in which certain behavioural norms associated with 
supranationalism – namely deliberation and consensus-seeking – have become 
uncoupled from their traditional supranational settings and function as the operative 
norms for EU Member States. Our point here is not to deny the role of supranational 
actors, but rather to acknowledge the fact that their relative importance in determining 
the character and direction of the integration process has been in question ever since 
Maastricht. 
We begin this article by situating our approach within existing theories of 
European integration, placing the emphasis on where we think our contribution lies. 
We then provide a contextualized explanation of the new intergovernmentalism by 
focusing on transformations in Europe's political economy and on the changing 
dynamics of preference formation in Europe. The final part presents a set of 
hypotheses associated with the new intergovernmentalism, which we hope can serve 
as catalysts for further research. 
 
The Politics of the Post-Maastricht Period 
 
In early theorizing about European integration, neofunctionalists stressed the 
importance of Community bodies (Haas, 2004) while intergovernmentalists pointed to 
the continuing relevance of nation-states (Hoffmann, 1995, pp. 71–106). Though they 
differed in their beliefs about the causes of integration, both converged in their 
assumption that integration entailed the empowerment of supranational actors. This 
assumption also underpins Schmitter's (2004) neo-neofunctionalism and is central to 
the ‘supranationalist school’, who define ‘institutionalization’ as ‘a process through 
which supranational governance – the competence of the European Community to 
make binding rules in any given policy domain – has developed’ (Sandholtz and 
Stone Sweet, 1998). As a result of this, Haas's heirs have struggled to explain the 
tendency towards integration without supranationalization in the post-Maastricht 
period. Liberal intergovernmentalism has seen itself as a voice of reason, but it too 
has downplayed the significance of integration in new areas of activity since 
Maastricht (Moravcsik, 2002; 2010). 
The same limitation is apparent in more recent rationalist theories of European 
integration that rely on incomplete contracts. With a similar methodology to liberal 
intergovernmentalism, these theories see the EU as subject to ongoing institutional 
change (Héritier, 2007). On its own, the concept of ‘incomplete contracts’ is agnostic 
about the future direction of integration. However, these authors assume that 
integration is driven by supranational actors who use the openness of incomplete 
contracts to expand their powers (Karagiannis and Héritier, 2013, p. 98; Cooley and 
Spruyt, 2009). 
Other contemporary scholarship on the EU distances itself from these 
concerns. In place of abstract writing on the ‘nature’ of the EU ‘beast’, much of 
today's scholarship is focused on individual policy areas or specific institutions. This 
development owes its debt to Wallace et al. (1977), who began the shift in EU studies 
from polity-building to policy-making. Such empiricism has led to many novel 
insights and generated a wealth of new knowledge in individual policy areas. The new 
governance literature, for instance, has been extremely useful in directing attention 
towards the practice of policy co-ordination and the functioning of de novo bodies 
and decentralized modes of governance (for example, De la Porte et al., 2001; Trubek 
and Mosher, 2003). A limitation of this ‘post-ontological’ turn is that it inhibits 
inquiry into any underlying trends that may characterize the post-Maastricht period as 
a whole (Bickerton, 2012, pp. 8–12). New discoveries are seen as deviations from 
established patterns rather than as instantiations of a new order. To take an example, 
the work on experimentalist governance presents these new modes of decentralized 
policy co-ordination as experimental departures from the Community method norm 
(Sabel and Zeitlin, 2008). Kenneth Armstrong (2011, p. 188) is right to note that 
sharp contrasts between the ‘old’ Community method and ‘new governance’ can be 
misleading as the latter is both a step away from, and an evolution in, the Community 
method. 
In this section, we trace the origins of the new intergovernmentalism through 
an examination of Europe's changing political economy and transformations in 
domestic politics within European states. The post-Maastricht period has of course 
been subject to much exogenous change: from the acceleration of globalization to the 
enlargement of the EU after the collapse of the Berlin Wall (Kriesi et al., 2008; 
Zielonka, 2006). Our own focus is not intended to dismiss this broader context, but 
rather to recognize that these exogenous forces have indeterminate institutional 
effects. Heightened economic competition in the late nineteenth century, for instance, 
resulted in a sharpening of national conflicts within Europe, growing protectionism 
and eventually war (Maier, 1981), whereas in the 1950s competitive pressures 
coincided with the first great wave of European integration. We seek to go beyond 
this indeterminacy by focusing on mid-range causal mechanisms that mediate 
between these exogenous forces and EU-level institutional change. 
The ambition to specify exactly how domestic politics matter for the European 
integration process has long been at the heart of intergovernmentalist concerns. 
Liberal intergovernmentalism has focused on domestic interest groups and has 
attempted to systematize the role played by socioeconomic interests, individual 
leaders and political ideology (Moravcsik, 1998). Our understanding of domestic 
politics is broader and, like Simon Bulmer's (1983) use of the term ‘national polity’, it 
includes problems of legitimacy and authority and treats the preference formation 
process itself as an input into institutional change at the EU level. From this 
perspective, preference formation and EU integration are not neatly separated in space 
and time, with the former occurring first at the national level and the latter following 
on in the form of strategic bargaining between Member State governments. Rather, 
EU integration has become increasingly shaped by pressures occurring within the 
processes of preference formation, creating a more dynamic and unstable set of 
relationships between domestic constituencies, Member State governments, and EU 
policies and institutions. 
 
The Political Economy of Post-Maastricht Integration 
 
Explaining the pursuit of integration in the absence of supranationalism involves 
differentiating the political economy of the post-Maastricht era with that of earlier 
periods. As scholars have noted, the 1950s and 1960s were the high point of 
‘embedded liberalism’, reflected in the actions and policy orientations of European 
Community institutions (Milward, 1992; Ruggie, 1998, pp. 62–84). Indeed, some of 
the chapter headings of Haas’ (2004) seminal work seem inescapably tied up with 
western Europe's golden age of postwar social democracy: ‘price policy’, ‘investment 
policy’, ‘cartel policy’, individual chapters on trade associations and trade unions. 
Two characteristics in particular differentiate this period from the post-
Maastricht era. First, while enough convergence existed for the first steps in European 
integration to be taken, the actual degree of substantive integration thereafter 
remained limited. Economists like Haberler or Belassa, who studied the effect of 
regional integration on economic growth in western Europe, concluded that its 
contribution was small (Majone, 2011, p. 21). The Treaty of Rome, Tony Judt (2005, 
p. 303) writes, remained ‘a declaration of future good intentions’ until the arrival of 
the Single European Act (SEA). European integration in this period is thus best 
considered as part of a broader national project of economic development (Schmidt, 
1996, p. 77; Milward, 1992). Second, contained within the national structures of 
postwar capitalism were very different political bargains struck between competing 
social forces (Schonfield, 1965). These lent to intergovernmental relationships a 
certain rigidity and implacability: national positions were not merely the preferences 
of individual elites, but were reflections of wider bargains between states and civil 
societies, with commitments to a ‘mixed economy’ serving as important obstacles to 
further European economic integration (Scharpf, 1999, p. 58). French positions in 
European negotiations, for instance, reflected not merely the views of de Gaulle, but 
also Gaullism as a determinate social and political formation within France (Johnson, 
1981, pp. 71–102; Anderson, 2009, pp. 87–9). When the postwar Golden Age gave 
way in the 1970s to heightened intra-European competition, the response of national 
governments was thus defensive and self-regarding. A Dutch proposal to pool the 
European Community's oil resources in order to mitigate the effects of the OPEC 
price rises, for instance, was rejected by other Member States whose better relations 
with Arab states gave them access to cheaper oil (Möckli, 2009, p. 191). 
The increase in the scope of EU activity after Maastricht was possible because 
of the undoing of these rigid national positions. This began with the convergence in 
Member State preferences around economic policy questions, what one European 
Commissioner has dubbed the ‘Maastricht orthodoxy’ (Andor, 2012). This 
convergence first took hold in the early 1980s but the abandonment of the postwar 
economic consensus was uneven and governments adopted different national 
strategies in their attempts to preserve the balance between growth and social 
protection (Gourevitch, 1986; Goldthorpe, 1987). By the beginning of the 1990s, a 
certain ideational uniformity prevailed among European political elites regarding the 
primacy of price stability, the limits of government intervention and the superiority of 
markets over planning as the pillars of societal organization (Scharpf, 1987). 
Keohane and Hoffmann (1991, p. 23) write that the SEA ‘resulted less from a 
coherent burst of idealism than from a convergence of national interests around the 
new pattern of policymaking: not the Keynesian synthesis of the 1950s and 1960s but 
the neoliberal, deregulatory programme of the 1980s’. In fact, driving this 
convergence of policy goals was a restructuring of the European state itself, where 
key postwar institutions and their corresponding policy frameworks were being 
dismantled (Bickerton, 2012, pp. 90–109; Stone, 2014). Central to this process was a 
growing recognition among national elites – from Mitterrand in France to Papandreou 
in Greece – of the limits of national strategies (Short, 2013; Mazower, 1998, p. 337). 
Hitherto, governments would pursue their goals via wider European frameworks and 
the rigid state-society ties that had conditioned government responses in the postwar 
period gave way to a looser set of relations that were less national in scope. This was 
the moment when the planning and big government instincts of the postwar era were 
finally jettisoned. Nation-states in Europe had become Member States. 
It is a striking feature of the post-Maastricht period that this ideational 
convergence paved the way for intergovernmental co-operation rather than delegation 
to supranational institutions. While a consensus emerged in the 1980s on the need for 
a supranational central bank, national authorities remained acutely aware in the 1990s 
and 2000s that a one-size-fits-all approach to fiscal policy and structural reforms was 
economically and politically problematic. This concern for the differences between 
national models of capitalism made EU-level deliberative practices all the more 
essential (Hall and Soskice, 2001, p. 56; Schmidt, 2009, p. 310). A key function of the 
Eurogroup among finance ministers is to exchange views on how national economic 
policies can be tailored to meet shared policy challenges. This is also true of the 
stability and growth pact (SGP) and the Six-Pack (Hodson, 2011). Institutional 
diversity across Member States is different, however, from competition between 
entities that are tightly integrated through national compacts between business and 
labour. The latter tends to impose limits upon EU activity, whereas the former does 
not. With the weakening of such compacts, governments sought European 
frameworks as a way of managing their institutional diversity and of disciplining their 
domestic constituents. 
This mixture of ideational convergence, institutional diversity and the 
unravelling of postwar compacts help us understand the intensification of integration 
after Maastricht and it also accounts in part for the popularity of more flexible and 
open-ended procedures. The shift towards such procedures had already begun under 
Jacques Delors’ third term as Commission President. The subsequent expansion of 
EU economic policy into the domains of macro-economic governance, including 
fiscal policy, wage and employment policy and the question of national welfare state 
reform, has continued this trend. The Lisbon Strategy of 2000 (which lives on in 
‘Europe 2020’) was the clearest evidence that Member States preferred peer pressure 
and consensus-building under the open method of co-ordination to the codification of 
reform commitments under the Community method (Hodson and Maher, 2001). 
United in their scepticism about the efficacy of national policy solutions, national 
governments have accommodated their institutional differences through decentralized 
policy co-ordination and elite and expert-level deliberation within bodies such as the 
Eurogroup and the economic and financial committee (Puetter, 2014). These 
differences are no longer tied to a Keynesian vision of the state, nor are they a 
reflection of an institutionalized balance of social forces at the domestic level. 
Consensus is thus easier to pursue (though not always attain) and the policy areas 
open to EU co-ordination are far greater in number. 
 
The End of the Permissive Consensus and Europe's Crisis of Political 
Representation 
 
The integration paradox is partly the result of political economy changes propelling 
national elites forward in their integration activities. However, it is also the result of 
new political constraints and challenges faced by these same elites. The early decades 
of European integration had benefitted from a ‘permissive consensus’ in which the 
people deferred to elites when it came to the pooling of sovereignty (Lindberg and 
Scheingold, 1970; Lahr, 2002, p. 248). Scholarship on the EU has come to recognize 
that much has changed in the post-Maastricht period. Euroscepticism, for instance, is 
increasingly being seen as an enduring feature of contemporary European integration 
rather than as an epiphenomenon (Usherwood and Startin, 2013). Interest, however, 
has mainly been in how European integration is contested, where and by whom 
(Marks and Steenbergen, 2004). Less attention has been paid to the way such conflict 
has refashioned the integration process itself. 
A key claim of the new intergovernmentalism is that preference formation at the 
national level has succumbed to difficulties in the articulation of interests and to a 
more generalized crisis of representative politics (Mair, 2008; Papadopoulos, 2013). 
Such difficulties stem from what Schmitter (2008, p. 208) has referred to as the 
‘generalized loosening of the links between interests and organizations’, meaning the 
unravelling of those interests forged out of the grand cleavages of religion and class 
and mediated by the Christian, social democratic and communist parties (Lipset and 
Rokkan, 1990 [1967]). In their place has arisen a volatile and indeterminate sort of 
politics, where individuals seek direction and guidance from a range of actors, many 
of whom do not last long on the political scene. Anger and frustration co-exist 
alongside more traditional organized interests, the legitimacy of which is increasingly 
contested by domestic publics. 
The crisis of representation comes from a growing disenchantment with 
representative politics and from what Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2012) call the 
‘strain of representation’ (Hayward, 1995; Crouch, 2004; Hay, 2007). In the face of 
declining memberships and weak partisan alignments, governing parties rely 
increasingly on the state's bureaucratic apparatus (courts, regulatory agencies, 
independent commissions) for their power and legitimacy (Katz and Mair, 1995). This 
only reaffirms people's belief in the existence of an undifferentiated political casta 
that rules in unrepresentative ways. Tellingly, during the austerity protests in Europe 
in 2011 and 2012, what prevailed was a belief that national democracy was failing its 
citizens (Kaldor and Selchow, 2012). 
The impact of these developments on European integration has been 
contradictory. On the one hand, they have strengthened the commitment of national 
executives to European policy-making, thus pushing the EU towards what Habermas 
called a system of ‘executive federalism’ (Habermas, 2011; Crum, 2013). On the 
other hand, the evident decline in the permissive consensus on the EU and concern 
about democratic representation has made governments wary about their involvement 
in pan-European policy-making. This has ushered in a marked separation between 
politics and policy-making, with the latter dominated by European co-operation and 
the former obstinately national in form (Schmidt, 2006). Committed to further rounds 
of policy co-ordination but having also to manage domestic disillusionment with 
representative politics, Member State governments have struggled to find any real 
equilibrium. At the European level, they have favoured more informal and ‘secluded’ 
modes of decision-making – a move the European Parliament has supported owing to 
the benefits it can reap from exercising its co-decision powers via the relative 
obscurity of inter-institutional agreements (Reh et al., 2013; Costa, 2014, pp. 82–9). 
As a result of this unravelling in the relationship between interests and organizations, 
and the impact upon the preference formation process at the domestic level, national 
executives in Europe often seem to identify more with one another than with their 
own populations. We saw this in the treaty negotiations of the 1990s and 2000s, in 
particular the machinations around ratifying the Lisbon Treaty after the rejection of 
the Constitutional Treaty in France, the Netherlands and Ireland. 
 
 
 
The New Intergovernmentalism: Six Hypotheses 
 
Building on the above account, we can now formulate a more precise set of 
expectations about European integration in the post-Maastricht period. In this section, 
we set out six hypotheses, each of which is related to a particular aspect of the new 
intergovernmentalism. We use the term ‘hypothesis’ in the same general way as it 
used by Brady and Collier (2010, p. 331) to refer to a ‘tentative answer to a research 
question’. The hypotheses aim to elucidate, explain and tease out the normative 
implications of the new intergovernmentalism. In other words, we hold that the 
answer to the question of what characterizes the paradoxical set-up of post-Maastricht 
integration is the occurrence and presence of the different institutional and political 
dynamics contained in the six hypotheses. Our concern in each case has been to 
ensure that each of our hypotheses stand as testable propositions and we believe there 
is sufficient research available already to give them much plausibility. We do not 
pretend to show conclusively in this article that the new intergovernmentalism can 
make sense of the integration paradox in ways that alternative theories cannot. 
Instead, our aim is to set out conceptual building blocks for further theory-refinement 
and testing. We do not explore in this article whether the new intergovernmentalism 
might have application beyond the EU. Our sense is that the new 
intergovernmentalism resonates with the informalization of global governance evident 
in bodies such as the G7 and IMF, but these linkages are not taken up here (on this 
point, see Bickerton, Hodson and Puetter, 2015: chapter 15). 
 
H1: Deliberation and consensus have become the guiding norms of day-to-day 
decision-making at all levels. 
 
While deliberation and consensus have been part of European integration from the 
very beginning, they have traditionally been understood as a subjective component of 
supranational institution-building (Haas, 2004). Simply put, deliberation and 
consensus-building were seen from this perspective as an attempt to foster agreement 
between Member States over policy means and ends and so pave the way for the 
delegation of new policy-making powers to the supranational level. The 
correspondence between these behavioural patterns and supranationalist dynamics has 
weakened in the post-Maastricht period, we contend, such that deliberation and 
consensus-building are now ends in themselves rather than a means to further 
supranationalist integration. Deliberation and consensus-building, in other words, 
have become institutionally deracinated from supranationalist dynamics and are today 
to be found at the heart of EU policy-making in general, and especially in settings that 
are explicitly intergovernmental in their institutional determinations. In comitology, 
for example, participants are formally sent as delegates of national administrations but 
interaction is mainly deliberative and consensus-seeking (Joerges and Neyer, 1997; 
Pollack, 2003b; cf. Dehousse et al., 2014). It is even true of the European Council and 
the Council of Ministers in EU economic governance, where the oxymoron of 
‘deliberative intergovernmentalism’ was coined in order to capture these new 
dynamics (Puetter, 2012; 2014). 
The importance of deliberation and consensus reflects the decentralized 
character of decision-making in the new areas of EU activity. Without strict 
adherence to consensus-seeking practices, collective action is impossible and 
inconsistent. Empirically, we therefore would expect to find evidence for a strong 
institutionalization of deliberative practices even though qualified majority voting has 
emerged as the default decision rule in many areas of EU policy-making. 
Grandstanding and the threat of using one's veto have, of course, not disappeared in 
this period, but they have become exceptional. Attempts to ‘go it alone’ are often 
widely condemned, as George Papandreou discovered when he attempted to introduce 
a referendum in Greece on its bail-out agreement. The achievement of consensus, or 
of ‘apparent consensus’ as Novak (2013) has demonstrated, has become the standard 
by which outcomes and institutions are judged. The failure to find such a consensus is 
considered, as Perry Anderson (2009, p. 62) memorably put it, an ‘unthinkable breach 
of etiquette’. 
Operating outside of a supranational decision-making logic, the responsibility 
for policy-making also lies more squarely on Member States. Thus, in comparison to 
earlier instances of consensus-seeking within core intergovernmental bodies like the 
Council of Ministers (see Bulmer, 1996), these norms of deliberation and consensus 
today go well beyond the discrete moments of institutional innovation marked by 
IGCs. They extend to the sort of day-to-day policy-making that requires renewed 
collective agreement at all stages of the policy process. Hence the intensive 
involvement of the European Council in the post-Maastricht period in the minutia of 
justice and home affairs policy and, especially after the global financial crisis struck, 
in economic governance. 
 
H2: Supranational institutions are not hard-wired to seek ever-closer union. 
 
A key feature of the new intergovernmentalism is that supranational institutions, far 
from resisting this turn towards decentralized modes of decision and policy-making, 
have often been complicit in it. The post-Maastricht period has been notable for the 
absence of a big push by the Commission for the centralization of decision-making in 
new areas of EU activity. While the EU's eastern enlargement may have played a role 
here, the timing suggests that enlargement has tended mainly to exaggerate pre-
existing trends present within EU institutions before 2004 (Ponzano et al., 2012). The 
Commission has not been bereft of ambition since Maastricht, but its energy has been 
directed at projects that involved few new transfers of powers to the supranational 
level. The Commission, for instance, lent its support to many of the new deliberative 
forms of decision-making by embracing the Lisbon Strategy and seeking a close 
working relationship with the Eurogroup. Even after the global financial crisis hit, the 
EU executive showed itself reluctant to seek new powers for itself (Hodson, 2013). 
Importantly, such tendencies are not limited to the Commission but apply also to the 
CJEU, which has showed ambivalence about the pursuit of ever closer union in new 
areas of EU activity (Saurugger and Terpan, 2014). We see this in the Court's ruling 
on the SGP in July 2004, which underlined Member States’ sovereignty in economic 
policy. 
These developments suggest that the preferences of supranational institutions 
themselves may not be as hard-wired towards supranationalism as was generally 
assumed by many EU scholars (for example, Pollack, 2003a; Cooley and Spruyt, 
2009). Instead, such institutions act strategically: when faced with a favourable 
environment for entrepreneurialism they may well take advantage of it, but, in a more 
hostile environment, they avoid putting forward proposals that stand little chance of 
success (Hodson, 2013). Another explanation refers to transformations in the 
institutions themselves. In the Commission's case, the trend towards choosing the 
President from the ranks of current or recent members of the European Council may 
explain the EU's sympathy towards intergovernmental decision-making, as might a 
degree of ideological divergence at the level of Commission services (see Kassim 
et al., 2013). A growing partisanship within the EU executive (Hix, 2008) may also 
complicate the institution's preferences as partisan considerations need not overlap 
with support for more supranational decision-making. 
For all of its expanding powers, the European Parliament is not necessarily a 
special case. The EU legislature has become a more partisan body during the post-
Maastricht period (as documented by Hix et al., 2006) and scholars have noted that 
the preferences for European integration play a secondary role among many of its 
members. Indeed, it may be more accurate to say that the Parliament's strongest 
preference is towards expanding its power within the constellation of EU institutions. 
More supranational decision-making may or may not be the route towards such a 
goal, and the Parliament has not been shy to act in ways that undermine the traditional 
Community method. 
 
H3: Where delegation occurs, governments and traditional supranational actors 
support the creation and empowerment of de novo bodies. 
 
A third hypothesis associated with the new intergovernmentalism is that integration in 
the post-Maastricht period has tended to entail the creation of de novo bodies rather 
than the empowerment of traditional supranational institutions. This preference for the 
creation of de novo bodies reflects a recurring political tension in the last two 
decades: Member States are reluctant to delegate authority to traditional supranational 
institutions such as the Commission and the Court because of the difficulties this 
presents in terms of public justification and legitimacy; and yet national executives 
are fully committed to collective action in areas such as border security and 
diplomacy – new areas of EU activity that need new institutional frameworks. We see 
this tension playing out in the marked proliferation of EU agencies since 1992. 
Defining agencies with any precision is difficult (see Schout and Pereyra, 2011) but 
even if we follow the Commission's narrow definition of agencies as regulatory 
bodies, the number of agencies has increased from three in 1993 to 32 by 2012 
(European Commission, 2009). 
The fact that de novo bodies are not supranational institutions in the traditional 
sense goes some way towards understanding national governments’ willingness to 
empower these bodies rather than the Commission and CJEU. There is an ambivalent 
relationship between de novo bodies and existing EU law: some are created within the 
EU treaties, others outside of them. The EEAS, for example, was constituted as ‘a 
functionally autonomous body of the Union under the authority of the High 
Representative’, with the High Representative serving as Vice President of the 
European Commission but also acting under a mandate of the Council of Ministers, a 
body the High Representative chairs (Article 18, Treaty on European Union [TEU]). 
The EEAS contrasts with the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), created in 
May 2010 to provide financial support to troubled eurozone members. It was created 
outside of the framework of the EU treaties and has as its shareholders eurozone 
finance ministers. The Commission and the ECB are represented only in an observer 
capacity. Straddling these two examples, we have the ESM, a permanent body, 
launched in September 2012 and similar in its institutional architecture to the EFSF. 
However, a revision to Article 136 of the TEU has opened the door to the formal 
creation of a crisis resolution mechanism within the treaties. Another key difference 
with the Commission is that de novo bodies have relatively simple and issue-specific 
mandates. They often have a strong intergovernmental strand to their governance 
structure that facilitates Member State control and prevents ‘mission creep’. The EU's 
border agency, Frontex, for instance, has on its management board representatives 
from each of the EU's Member States, as does the board of governors of the ESM. 
Though Member States may have become wary of delegating authority to 
supranational institutions, it would be wrong to reduce the interest in de novo bodies 
to merely a power struggle between national governments and existing supranational 
bodies. Given that the vast majority of de novo bodies derive their legal status from 
secondary law, this can only mean that the Commission has been complicit in their 
creation. While the European Commission has traditionally defended the Meroni 
doctrine – which limits the discretionary powers granted to EU agencies (Kelemen 
and Majone, 2012) – this defence has become more qualified in the post-Maastricht 
period. The Commission's support for bodies such as the EEAS or the ESM may be 
only grudgingly given (especially in the case of the EEAS), but it nevertheless 
suggests that the turn towards the use of de novo bodies signals a shift in the pattern 
of EU integration that is broader than merely the victory of Member States over 
supranational institutions. Indeed, the CJEU's ambivalence towards de novo bodies in 
the Pringle case
4
 suggests that complicity with this trend extends to the Court as well. 
 
H4: Problems in domestic preference formation have become standalone inputs into 
the European integration process. 
 
Our arguments above about the political economy of post-Maastricht integration and 
the end of the permissive consensus imply a different view of the role played by 
domestic preference formation processes in determining EU policy-making. These 
processes above all need to be historicized and placed within the contexts of ruling 
ideologies, the precise substance of contestation in a given period, patterns of state-
society relations and their associated institutional dynamics (Schmidt, 2009). In this 
we deviate from liberal intergovernmentalism and its ‘societal’ or ‘liberal’ model of 
preference formation (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009, p. 69). In our view, this 
account of domestic preference formation rests upon an unnecessarily reductive 
notion of domestic politics. Sectoral interests undoubtedly influence the positions 
governments take in EU negotiations, but the role of domestic politics in EU 
integration is broader than this. 
How interests represent themselves to the rest of society – whether it be in the 
form of factions at court, estates, parliamentary groupings, mass parties or new social 
movements – has always been contested and in flux (Maier, 1981), but the post-
Maastricht period has been marked by a growing distrust in the political system as a 
whole. Instead of spurring people on to organize themselves differently, as occurred 
in the past, political life itself has been recast around this sentiment of distrust in the 
body politic. Populist movements direct their criticism at the political establishment 
as a whole, while the Pirate parties of Germany and Sweden focus on procedural 
issues such as transparency. As seen with the ‘Indignados’ in Spain, anger and 
frustration have become a basis for mobilization. In Germany, the word of the year in 
2010 was ‘wutbürger’ (angry citizen) (Kaldor and Selchow, 2012). In Eastern Europe, 
corruption of the political class has become a key political concern, discrediting many 
post-1989 political parties and institutions (Krastev, 2007). Concern about the 
political process itself, and not only its outputs, has steadily become a central focus 
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for contestation in Europe in the post-Maastricht period and this shapes the direction 
taken by European integration. 
We thus expect to find that domestic politics matters not only in the form of 
sectoral interests around which national governments bargain within EU 
intergovernmental settings; we must also consider how public concerns about 
representation, legitimacy and the organization and articulation of interests affect the 
institutional make-up of the EU. What matters for the new intergovernmentalism are 
the growing indeterminacy of preferences, the interaction between sectoral interests 
and more disparate and protean anti-political sentiments, and concern with the 
procedural as well as the substantive components of policies. 
 
H5: The differences between high and low politics have become blurred. 
 
Another feature of the new intergovernmentalism is the blurring of the distinction 
between high and low politics. This does not simply mean, as scholars have long 
observed (for example, Christensen, 1981), that no area really classifies anymore as 
‘high’ or ‘low’. The original intention behind the distinction was not to grant special 
status to some policy areas over others, though Hoffmann had given this impression 
in his earlier writing. As he put it: ‘[A]s the artichoke is slowly eaten, the 
governments become ever more vigilant’ (Hoffmann, 1995, p. 85). Writing later, he 
suggested that what qualified as ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics varied over time, the 
determining factor being an issue area's ‘momentary salience’ (Hoffmann, 1995, p. 
218). Here he had in mind the rapid politicization of seemingly uncontroversial issues 
of ‘low’ politics, such as economic growth and welfare in the Golden Age of postwar 
European capitalism, following the economic crisis of the 1970s. 
The differences between Hoffmann's account and the contemporary blurring 
between high and low politics in the post-Maastricht period are twofold. First, 
according to Hoffmann (1995, p. 218), salience refers to those issues of an existential 
nature for states: in his words, ‘how essential it appears to the government for the 
survival of the nation or for its own survival’. What is striking about the post-
Maastricht period is that existential concerns are often posed in relationship to a 
country's isolation or withdrawal from the logic of European integration – not from its 
application. This can be seen, for example, in repeated calls during this time for EU 
Member States to speak with one voice internationally or risk a diminished role on the 
world stage (see, for example, Blair, 2005). In fact, the zero-sum relation Hoffmann 
posited between national existence and involvement in European integration is today 
found mostly on the margins of Eurosceptic sentiment. 
A second difference is that Hoffmann assumes a degree of correspondence 
between popular and elite sentiment in order that an issue be judged salient for a 
country as a whole. As already emphasized above, under conditions of considerable 
disaffection by publics regarding the views of politicians, and scepticism about their 
role as representatives, such correspondence is often absent. The UK's decision to 
walk away from negotiations over the fiscal compact in December 2011, for example, 
was viewed as reflecting sectoral interests (the defence of the City of London) and 
party politics (tensions within the Conservative Party) rather than any clear-cut 
defence of the national interest. The difference between high and low politics have 
thus been blurred because of the difficulties in forging any single and coherent 
narrative about the national interest that could meet the standards of Hoffmann's 
‘momentary salience’ and thus qualify as belonging to high politics. 
 
  
H6: The EU is in a state of disequilibrium. 
 
In its account of the post-Maastricht period, this article has sought to emphasize the 
unstable and contradictory nature of contemporary European integration. As Europe 
has moved away from the postwar economic consensus and as elites have converged 
upon a set of macroeconomic goals and expectations that are sceptical about the 
efficacy of national instruments and policy tools, so has liberalization accentuated and 
sharpened the institutional differences between national societies, requiring co-
ordination via decentralized channels. Post-Maastricht political developments, 
particularly the growing fragmentation of societal interests and the demise of the 
permissive consensus, have led to an uncoupling of policy-making from national 
politics which often leaves national elites at odds with the wishes of their domestic 
constituencies. Far from being a passing phase or a product of the economic crisis 
since 2007, this instability lies at the core of European integration in the post-
Maastricht period. 
In studying the EU from the perspective of disequilibrium, this approach breaks 
with a strong scholarly preference for focusing on stability and continuity. While 
Haas agonized about the periodic crises facing the European Community in the 1950s 
and 1960s – to the point where he declared peremptorily in his 1968 preface that ‘de 
Gaulle has proved us wrong’ (Haas, 2004, p. xxiii) – supranationalists in the 1990s 
and 2000s have been far more sanguine about the fate of the EU. References to crises 
in Sandholtz and Stone Sweet (1998) are few and far between, and where they do 
arise they tend to focus on the pre-Maastricht period. While some authors 
acknowledge the end of the permissive consensus, they see public support for policy 
integration among EU Member States as favourable on the whole. Stone Sweet et al. 
(2001) are more open to the possibility of crisis in the European project, though their 
prediction that ‘the people of Europe’ could tire of having so much decision-making 
ceded to the ‘Brussels complex’ gives no indication that this scenario had already 
come to pass at the time of writing. 
Liberal intergovernmentalism has been even more upbeat in its assessment of 
the EU. In his defence of the EU against the charge of the democratic deficit, 
Moravcsik (2002) argued that the indirect accountability of the EU to its citizens via 
the mediating role of Member State governments was an adequate source of 
democratic legitimation. Since then, he has been quick to call for calm in moments of 
perceived crisis. When confronted with the collapse of the European constitution in 
2005, his conclusion was Panglossian in its optimism. He argued that by bringing the 
EU back in line with its reliance upon the indirect legitimacy of Member State-based 
representation, the failure of the European Constitution was in fact a good thing for 
the European project (Moravcsik, 2006). 
In its interest in the fundamental disequilibrium at the heart of post-Maastricht 
integration, this article does not seek to put forward an optimistic or a pessimistic 
account. Such subjectivism has marred much of the EU studies field, making it 
difficult for critical accounts of EU activity not to be taken as an unbecoming lapse of 
faith (Majone, 2009, pp. 2–3). The goal here is to present an analytical account of 
European integration that treats disequilibrium as a property of the post-Maastricht 
phase and opens up fundamental questions about the durability of European 
intergovernmentalism as things stand. A key question as the EU enters its third 
decade since Maastricht is whether the consensus between national and EU policy-
makers will hold as the challenges of closer co-operation without recourse to 
traditional forms of delegation deepen. More fundamental still is whether the 
disconnect between national elites and domestic constituencies can persist as 
Eurosceptic parties move closer to the mainstream and popular concerns about the 
merits of EU membership intensify. 
 
Conclusions 
 
European integration in the post-Maastricht period is characterized by an important 
paradox. Integration has proceeded apace and has gone far beyond what was achieved 
in the heyday of Robert Schuman, Jean Monnet and Jacques Delors. However, the 
manner in which this integration has taken place has largely eschewed the classical 
Community method. We have seen integration take place in the absence of 
supranationalism, with new institutions created that have concentrated the powers and 
activities of national governments and national representatives. Policy-making has 
developed informally, escaping many of the legislative frameworks that characterized 
supranational lawmaking beyond the nation-state. Understanding this development 
requires a new effort in theorizing post-Maastricht integration. Instead of merely 
contrasting the new with the old, we have shown how new policy areas that did not – 
or only in a very limited form – exist before the Maastricht Treaty have been based on 
what we call ‘the new intergovernmentalism’. The Commission and the CJEU have 
been reshaped in the post-Maastricht era and are no longer the ‘engines of integration’ 
that they once were. Even the European Parliament has been a willing participant in 
some of these developments. 
This article has given an explanation for this new intergovernmentalism by 
locating it in the conjunction of deep-seated changes in Europe's political economy 
and in an unstable set of political dynamics that have increasingly pitted pro-
integration elites against more sceptical populations. In developing this account, the 
article has taken much from intergovernmentalist theories and from the new 
governance literature, while drawing attention to the limitations of these approaches. 
In coining the term ‘the new intergovernmentalism’ the article hopes to engage in a 
fundamental debate about methods of integration that has fallen out of favour in 
recent years. Many scholars have preferred to focus on specific aspects of the EU 
‘beast’, satisfying themselves with the thought that whatever it is, at least it is still 
with us (Leca, 2009, p. 312). This article has argued strongly that these policy- and 
institution-specific analyses need to be combined with broader reflections upon the 
nature of the EU. Without such reflection, all change appears to us as modifications or 
adaptations to the status quo. 
By putting forward six hypotheses, this article has made concrete suggestions of 
how to combine such broader reflections with the analysis of specific, empirically 
testable instances of EU policy-making and institutional development. We claim that 
a distinctive form of European integration has emerged in the post-Maastricht period; 
one that is a product of its own time rather than an extension of the longer running 
integration process initiated in the early 1950s. We hope that in making this argument, 
and in drawing attention to some of the fundamental disequilibria that characterize 
European integration today, we can generate analytical and normative debates about 
the EU and its role in the political life of Europe. 
For some, ‘deliberation’ refers to a ‘discussion mode’, whereas ‘consensus’ is a 
decision-making procedure (Dehousse et al., 2014, p. 845; Novak, 2013; Urfalino, 
2007). In fact, both terms can also be framed as behavioural norms, which is the 
approach taken in this article. The concept of ‘behavioural norm’ draws on Haas 
(2004, p. 59), who thought of European integration as being not only about the 
creation of a specific decision-making regime, but also a certain style of politics 
regulated by particular norms of behaviour. 
We think of the Commission and CJEU as traditional supranational institutions 
insofar as they are founded on a formal mandate, which grants them enough 
autonomy from Member States that they can take independent decisions and build up 
their own bureaucratic resources. Traditional intergovernmental institutions, by 
contrast, are founded on the representation of Member States and deal with collective 
decision-making through forms of voluntary policy co-ordination. They include the 
European Council, the Council, the Eurogroup and high-level policy committees such 
as the political and security committee. 
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